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Executive summary
The combination of banking union and Brexit justifies a reform of the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in the near term, 
in line with the subsidiarity principle. The other EU-level financial authorities, namely the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB), Single Resolution Board (SRB) and Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), do 
not immediately require a legislative overhaul.
For operational reasons, the October 2017 deadline currently set for the decision on 
EBA relocation from its current base in London to the EU27 must be respected. In a later 
phase, the EBA’s governance should also be reviewed to take into account the framework of 
banking union as is currently in place, including the SRB and SSM. 
ESMA should be quickly upgraded into a strong and authoritative hub for European Union 
capital markets supervision and, more generally, financial conduct supervision. This entails a 
significant overhaul of its governance and funding framework, together with an expansion of 
its supervisory mandate. 
The accountability of EBA and ESMA and their scrutiny by the European Parliament 
should be enhanced as a key element of their governance reform.
Further initiatives, including possibly the merger of the SSM, EBA and EIOPA, sepa-
ration of the SSM from the European Central Bank (ECB), and the folding of the ESRB into the 
ECB, might be considered in the more distant future, but not in the near term as they would 
unnecessarily distract from more urgent tasks. 
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1  Is now the right time for a debate about 
reforming the EU financial supervisory 
architecture? 
Yes for the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Au-
thority (ESMA), no for the others. The EBA Regulation requires urgent revision because it spe-
cifically refers to London as the EBA’s location and this has to change because of Brexit. Less 
immediately, an adjustment is needed to the EBA’s governance following the entry into force 
of the SSM Regulation ((EU) No 1024/2013) in 2014 and the emergence of the Single Supervi-
sory Mechanism (SSM) as Europe’s most important bank supervisor. ESMA needs reform as a 
consequence of Brexit. Brexit will inevitably trigger a change to the EU capital markets land-
scape, from a highly centralised EU28 hub-and-spoke structure with London at its core, to an 
EU27 distributed-network arrangement in which several financial centres will play significant 
roles in different member states. As a consequence, and in line with the subsidiarity principle, 
the need for a strong EU-level capital markets authority has become even more pressing to 
ensure consistency and avoid a regulatory or supervisory race to the bottom inside the EU27, 
and also to deliver an undistorted approach in relation to third countries (including the UK 
after 2019). ESMA should thus partly take over the role played up to now by the UK authorities 
of monitoring and supervising EU wholesale markets, as no single national jurisdiction will 
be in a position to do so on its own. Such an expanded role in turn calls for a comprehensive 
overhaul of ESMA’s governance and funding1. 
The other EU-level financial authorities do not require major institutional reform in the 
short term. The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) is in a dif-
ferent situation to the EBA, since it does not have to move and there is no equivalent to bank-
ing union for insurance supervision. The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) does not have 
powers of enforcement, and Brexit might reduce its usefulness as a separate institution, but 
there is no need for rapid action and any reform can await a future review, while other more 
urgent EU legislative projects are given priority. The SSM and the Single Resolution Board 
(SRB) started their operations recently, and it is not yet time for a comprehensive re-examina-
tion of the corresponding EU legislation. Furthermore, it should be noted that the SSM Reg-
ulation can only be modified by unanimity and the European Central Bank’s governance by 
treaty change. The ESM is left outside of the scope of this statement2. 
2  What principles should guide reform? 
Simplicity/clarity
The European Union has created six new financial regulatory and supervisory institutions 
since 2010, namely the EBA, EIOPA, ESMA, ESRB, SRB and SSM, as referred to above. Some 
of the resulting institutional complexity was unavoidable given EU realities, especially the fact 
1   The argument for the build-up and reform of ESMA as a consequence of Brexit is developed in Sapir, Schoenmaker 
and Véron (2017). 
2   The ESM has a Banking Department to support its role as possible operator of direct bank recapitalisations, and is 
thus in principle involved in the new European financial supervisory architecture, even though its main purpose is 
to provide financial assistance to euro-area countries. Its direct bank recapitalisation instrument, however, has not 
yet been activated. 
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that banking union was introduced as a euro-area policy (albeit with an option to expand3) 
while the geographical scope of the European System of Financial Supervision (including the 
EBA, EIOPA, ESMA, collectively referred to as the three ESAs, and the ESRB) covers the entire 
European Economic Area. Even so, institutional complexity generates frictions and inefficien-
cies and should be limited or reduced to the greatest extent possible. As a consequence, and 
unless there is an urgent need, the European Union should avoid creating more new institu-
tions in this area of policy. Merging or discontinuing any of the six above-listed new institu-
tions, however, does not appear advisable at the current juncture. Nor should legislators feel 
constrained to adopt parallel arrangements for the three ESAs, including with respect to their 
governance and funding: the three agencies serve different purposes and it is inevitable that 
their respective arrangements should diverge further, as is examined below4. Meanwhile, 
further pooling of authority from the national to the European level, in line with the subsidiar-
ity principle (see below), could reduce the current complexity and simultaneously eliminate 
current national distortions. 
An additional layer of complexity results from the fact that the rules (known as technical 
standards) drawn up by the three ESAs only acquire binding status after their endorsement by 
the European Commission as Commission regulations (delegated or implementing acts). The 
Commission has the right to amend or refuse proposals from the three authorities, but would 
be wise to exercise this right parsimoniously in order to buttress the authority of the ESAs and 
ensure the independence of the regulatory process from political interference. As a matter 
of better regulation, the Commission should systematically and publicly explain its motives 
whenever it decides not to accept a regulatory proposal from the EBA, EIOPA or ESMA. 
Subsidiarity and proportionality
The subsidiarity principle stipulates that “the Union shall act only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either 
at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of 
the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level” (Article 5(3) Treaty on the European 
Union). The experience of the financial crisis in the last decade has profoundly reframed the 
debate about subsidiarity in EU financial services policy, since it has brought to the fore the 
existence of a bank-sovereign vicious circle that before 2009 was not anticipated5. Since June 
2012, statements by euro-area heads of state and government and from the European Council 
have repeatedly affirmed that “it is imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and 
sovereigns.” This political commitment at the highest level justifies the dramatic expansion of 
EU-level authority over the banking sector, since the aim to break the vicious circle can evi-
dently not be achieved by actions at the national level only, even assuming those actions are 
coordinated. In turn, the broadly successful early implementation of the SSM Regulation6 has 
provided a ‘proof of concept’ for supranational financial supervision in the European Union, 
a proposition that was previously deemed either utopian, or at best, suitable only for non-sys-
temic market segments7. As a consequence, it is appropriate under the subsidiarity principle 
to envisage greater authority for ESMA over financial firms and market segments that have 
a clear pan-European dimension, and the supervision of which exclusively at national level 
is likely to result in market distortion, unnecessary fragmentation of the single market, and/
3   The close cooperation procedure, set out in the SSM Regulation, allows any EU member state that has not adopted 
the euro as its currency to join the banking union on a voluntary basis. No EU member state has so far done so. 
4   The divergence effectively started with the 2014 legislative reform of EBA governance that was discussed and 
adopted simultaneously as the SSM Regulation, with no equivalent for EIOPA and ESMA. 
5   Section II.A in Véron (2016) details the gradual emergence of the euro-area bank-sovereign vicious circle in the 
awareness of the analytical and policy communities from 2009 to 2012. 
6   An early assessment of the SSM is provided in Schoenmaker and Véron (2016).  
7   ESMA took over supervisory authority for credit rating agencies in mid-2011, and for trade repositories in late 
2013, under single market regulations approved before the start of banking union (respectively CRA II and the 
European Market Infrastructure Regulation (648/2012)). 
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or a supervisory ‘race to the bottom’, triggered by supervisory competition in an integrated 
cross-border EU market. More broadly, and as developed in the next subsection, the integra-
tion of the banking and capital-markets components of the European financial system are 
complementary, mutually supporting policy endeavours to achieve both higher growth and 
greater stability. The application of the subsidiarity principle to these objectives suggests a 
more comprehensive supervisory framework at the Union level than is currently the case8. 
This does not imply, of course, that all financial services policies could or should be con-
centrated at EU level. In 2009, member states committed themselves to a ‘single rulebook’ for 
prudential and market regulation, following their discussion of the Larosière Report (Euro-
pean Commission, 2009) and as they simultaneously decided to establish the three ESAs. But 
this vision remains far from fulfilled, partly (but not only) because of differences in national 
legal frameworks. There is a widespread consensus that the day-to-day supervision of smaller 
financial firms that serve local markets should be carried out by national authorities, even if 
the corresponding supervisory policies are set at the European level: for banking supervision, 
such an arrangement has been embedded in the SSM Regulation. Moreover, policies that 
have a structural impact on the financial system, including the taxation of financial firms and 
activities, insolvency law and the frameworks for pension financing and for housing finance, 
are generally not understood as pertaining to the ‘single rulebook’ and can be expected to 
remain overwhelmingly at the national (or subnational) level for the foreseeable future. 
As for proportionality, there is a longstanding debate, which is in no way unique to the 
European Union, about whether smaller financial institutions should be subject to a lighter 
regulatory framework than larger ones. Under principles of good regulation, it is appropri-
ate to constantly question whether the burden of regulatory compliance is excessive and 
whether it can be reduced without affecting the fulfilment of its objectives. Caution, however, 
is justified in this respect by two main considerations. First, the history of financial crises 
gives overwhelming support to the proposition that small banks together can contribute as 
much to systemic risk as large ones, and in some cases even more. Examples of systemic 
banking crises that illustrate this include the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s in the United 
States, and the Spanish crisis of the early 2010s in which problems were concentrated in the 
medium-sized savings banks (cajas de ahorros) rather than in the largest financial institu-
tions (such as BBVA and Santander, which comparatively benefited from their geographical 
and business-model diversification). Second, small banks that participate in an institutional 
protection scheme are bound together by contingent commitments of mutual support, and 
should thus not be viewed as isolated entities for the purposes of systemic risk analysis and 
prudential regulation, even if their operational management is entirely decentralised. The 
relevant scale to consider in such cases for the application of any proportionality thresholds 
is the combined size of all entities included in the institutional protection scheme, not that of 
the individual participating entities. 
Growth and financial stability
 EU financial services policy should enable the financial sector to contribute to economic 
growth in all EU member states while safeguarding financial stability. There are trade-offs 
between growth and stability in many areas of financial regulation, for example bank capital 
requirements. But a single, integrated European financial system underpinned by a consist-
ent financial supervisory architecture is desirable from the perspective of both growth and 
stability, compared to the present reality of incomplete integration with cross-border barriers 
created by different regulatory requirements and divergent practices of supervision and regu-
latory enforcement. This insight underlies banking union, as the prior fragmentation of super-
8   The further legislative strengthening of the banking union, which is similarly critical to achieving the stated ob-
jectives, is not discussed in this statement. Specific policy suggestions in this respect are outlined in, for example, 
Schoenmaker and Véron (2016) and Sapir, Schoenmaker and Véron (2017). 
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vision and crisis management frameworks across national lines was at the root of the harmful 
bank-sovereign vicious circle9. The same insight underlies the EU policy of capital markets 
union (CMU), first spelled out by European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker in 
mid-2014 and at the time of writing under review by the European Commission. 
CMU is a critical initiative to address the excessive reliance of the European Union’s 
financial system on banks, or “bank bias” (Langfield and Pagano, 2015), thus improving the 
prospects of access to external finance for small and medium-sized enterprises and other 
economic agents, and increasing the resilience of the European Union in future crises. It is a 
fundamentally complementary project to banking union, with the two efforts supporting each 
other (eg Constâncio, 2017). But CMU has not made much significant progress so far, and this 
is directly linked to the debate about financial architecture. Echoing the previous point about 
subsidiarity, there is an increasingly widespread recognition that the promise of CMU can 
only be fulfilled by stronger EU-level authority over a number of capital market segments and 
financial firms with cross-border scope, much of which can be achieved through the fur-
ther empowerment and reform of ESMA, particularly in the new context created by Brexit10. 
Similarly, the prudential oversight of financial firms whose orderly operation is critical to the 
EU financial system, such as international central counterparties (CCPs), calls for pooling at 
the EU level to achieve the objectives of supporting growth and stability, a challenge that has 
been made significantly more pressing by the prospect of Brexit11. 
Separation of conduct supervision from prudential supervision
 This principle, referred to in the specialist community as ‘twin peaks’ supervisory architec-
ture12, might sound less obvious than those listed above, but is worth high-level attention. 
Prudential supervision is the supervision of financial firms, especially banks, insurers and 
relevant financial market infrastructure, to ensure their resilience in crisis situations and to 
support crisis-management actions if needed. By contrast, conduct supervision (also known 
as conduct-of-business supervision) supports objectives other than financial stability, includ-
ing consumer and investor protection, financial market integrity, the fight against terrorism 
and money laundering, and the enforcement of financial sanctions against certain jurisdic-
tions. There is some overlap between the two objectives, for example in the supervisory vet-
ting of senior executives in financial firms known as the ‘fit-and-proper test’. But the two types 
of supervision generally require different mindsets and skills, and occasionally conflict with 
each other. Especially in times of financial crisis, or to avert a crisis, the imperative of financial 
stability can be so overwhelming that authorities might neglect some conduct duties in order 
to help firms satisfy prudential requirements – for example, authorities might close their eyes 
to questionable commercial practices if these help a bank to increase its profitability and 
capital. Conversely, in non-crisis times, conduct mandates might be so all-absorbing that 
prudential considerations are neglected, as arguably happened in the run-up to 2007 at the 
UK Financial Services Authority in its supervision of several British banks (including North-
ern Rock and Royal Bank of Scotland) or at the US Securities and Exchange Commission in its 
9   The stated aim of banking union, namely breaking the bank-sovereign vicious circle, implies that any euro-area 
bank could fail without affecting any of the member states’ sovereign creditworthiness, and that conversely, any 
member state’s sovereign debt could be restructured if needed, without threatening the stability of the area’s bank-
ing system. This objective remains unfulfilled (see previous footnote), and it has become increasingly accepted 
over the past decade that its fulfilment would greatly contribute to financial stability in the euro area and European 
Union. 
10  See Véron and Wolff (2015) for an early exposition of this argument, and also Nicolas Véron, ‘A Post-Brexit Oppor-
tunity Europe Shouldn’t Miss: The EU should finally implement its long-delayed capital markets union,’ Bloomberg 
View, 14 July 2016. 
11  This point is also developed in Sapir, Schoenmaker and Véron (2017). 
12  The reference is to an essay by Michael Taylor, a British financial regulatory expert, in which the principle was first 
spelled out (Taylor, 1995). Examples of countries which have adopted the twin-peaks concept include Australia, 
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 
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supervision of large broker-dealers (including Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers). Various 
cases of mis-selling of securities in several European countries (including most prominent-
ly Italy in recent years, but also Finland, Slovenia, Spain and others in the past), when banks 
sold their own risky shares, subordinated debt and/or senior debt instruments to retail 
clients including some with low levels of financial literacy, can be considered in a similar 
light, suggesting that the enforcement of consumer protection regulation in the financial 
sector should not be entrusted to prudential supervisors. While there is no obvious need to 
institutionally separate the prudential supervision of insurers from that of banks, there is 
a strong case for conduct supervision, including many functions of capital markets over-
sight, carried out by institutions that are separate and independent from those in charge of 
prudential supervision13. 
The adoption of a twin peaks approach for the European Union does not imply that EBA 
and EIOPA should merge in the foreseeable future. This is because neither EBA nor EIOPA are 
supervisors of banks or insurers, a reality that their merger would not change. Furthermore, 
there are treaty constraints that currently prevent the ECB’s supervisory scope from being 
enlarged to cover insurance companies14. As a consequence, the respective institutional 
membership structures of EBA and EIOPA are unlikely to converge any time soon, and this 
justifies their continued existence as separate institutions for the moment. 
Cost effectiveness
 On the basis of readily available evidence, there has been so far no indication of waste or any 
other significant operational dysfunction in the authorities reviewed here. If anything, there 
are strong indications of insufficient resources for at least some of the authorities. An early re-
view of EBA by the European Court of Auditors (2014) concluded that “Overall, EBA’s resources 
during its start-up phase were insufficient to allow it to fulfil its mandate.” In November 2014, 
ESMA, EBA and EIOPA sent a joint letter to the ECOFIN President, subsequently made public, 
suggesting that the budgetary trajectory then envisaged for them “would severely undermine 
our capacity to continue to deliver on the objectives set out in the ESAs’ regulations and the 
tasks we were given by the legislators”15. More recently, the European Court of Auditors (2016) 
found “indications that current staffing levels are insufficient” at the SSM. The EU financial 
authorities’ costs and operations should be further scrutinised on an ongoing basis, not least 
by the European Court of Auditors, to ensure there is no drift in this area. 
3  What are the implications for the reform 
of EBA and ESMA? 
European Banking Authority
 As mentioned above, the immediate case for amending the EBA Regulation (last modified in 
2014) is the EBA’s forced relocation as a consequence of Brexit. Recent media reports suggest 
a target date of October 2017 for the final decision16. It is highly desirable that the correspond-
13  This argument is developed in Schoenmaker and Véron (2017). 
14  Article 127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the legal basis for the SSM Regulation, 
specifically excludes insurance undertakings from the possible scope of prudential supervision by the ECB. 
15  The letter was accessed at https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/esas_2014-41_joint_
esas_letter_to_eu_council_presidency_-_esas_budget.pdf. See also Huw Jones, ‘EU cash squeeze threatens post-cri-
sis financial reforms: watchdogs’, Reuters, 14 September 2015. 
16  Alex Barker and Paul McClean, ‘Brussels sets rules for Brexit regulatory agencies fight: July deadline for bids for 
medicines and banking bodies ahead of October vote’, Financial Times, 23 May 2017. 
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ing decision be made by that date and not further delayed, because of the obvious damage 
caused by the current uncertainty for the EBA’s operations, the motivation of its staff and its 
capacity to attract new talent. The corresponding EU legislative process should be expedited 
swiftly after that decision17. Beyond the relocation decision, it is also desirable to review the 
EBA’s governance to adapt it to the new context created by banking union, even though the 
same operational concern suggests a separate and later legislative process for that. Currently, 
the only voting members in the EBA’s Board of Supervisors are representatives of national 
supervisory authorities from all EU member states (including those inside and outside the 
euro area), but the SRB is an observer and the SSM an ‘other member’ with no voting rights. 
This setup is evidently not in line with the new reality of banking supervision in the euro area, 
in which the ECB (through the SSM) is the sole licensing authority and the direct supervisor 
of banks representing four-fifths of total assets. The SRB is likewise the resolution authority 
for most of the system. While national supervisors still directly oversee most small banks, they 
no longer have autonomous roles in the development of prudential supervisory policies. As a 
consequence, the European Union should consider a significant overhaul of the governance 
of the EBA so its institutional membership would be reduced to the ECB, SRB and national 
authorities from non-euro-area countries, while making it more effectively accountable to 
the European Parliament. This is no trivial task, and no specific blueprint is suggested here – 
further debate would be needed to reach that point. Beyond these challenges of location and 
governance, there is no obvious reason at this juncture to materially change the mandate of 
EBA and its scope of responsibilities. 
European Securities and Markets Authority
In contrast to the EBA, the arguments highlighted in the previous section add up to a strong 
case for the expansion of ESMA’s mandate and scope of responsibilities, including a signif-
icant broadening of the range of EU wholesale market segments and financial firms over 
which it is to have direct supervisory authority, and a pooling within ESMA of many interna-
tional duties (relative to authorities and firms in third countries outside the European Union) 
currently assigned to national market authorities within the European Union. Specifically, 
ESMA should be the responsible authority in the European Union for the authorisation of sig-
nificant market intermediaries (including banks and securities firms) under the MiFID/MiFIR 
legislation18; for the conduct supervision of CCPs that are systemically relevant for the Union, 
including those established in third countries (a key current debate in the run-up to Brexit); 
and for the supervision of audit firms and the enforcement of financial disclosure require-
ments by listed companies. As with banking union, and in line with the subsidiarity principle, 
this may entail appropriate delegation of suitable operational tasks, under a single policy 
framework and with ESMA retaining ultimate responsibility, to relevant authorities in the 
member states, such as BaFin (the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority), DPR (Financial 
Reporting Enforcement Panel) and the Abschlussprüferaufsichtsstelle (Audit Oversight Body) 
in Germany. For example, it appears natural that registrations of investment management 
companies and funds should remain in the hands of national authorities in line with such 
a delegation concept. This would also create a sound basis for later broadening of ESMA’s 
responsibilities to cover the protection of retail customers of financial services (including 
banking and insurance services), should the European Union decide to engage in further 
harmonisation efforts in that area, in line with the above suggested ‘twin peaks’ approach. 
17  As for the specific location to be chosen, Schoenmaker and Véron (2017) make the case for Frankfurt as the 
EBA’s new location based on arguments of geographical proximity with the ECB/SSM and EIOPA, as well as the 
alternative case for relocation in a non-euro-area EU member state to signal a commitment for the EBA not to be 
dominated by banking union interests. 
18  MiFIR: Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (600/2014); MiFID: Markets in Financial Instruments Direc-
tive(s) (2012/92/EC and 2014/65/EU).
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Simultaneously, ESMA’s governance and funding framework requires a significant 
overhaul to be suited to such enlarged responsibilities. This is for reasons other than those 
suggested above for the EBA: there can be no specificity of euro-area countries in the ESMA 
framework. Rather, ESMA’s governance needs to be suited to the duties of an independent 
supervisory agency, which is not the case with the current intergovernmental setup of ESMA’s 
board of supervisors (and even as ESMA, as previously mentioned, already has some limited 
direct supervisory competencies). In line with established best practice both in the EU (with 
the SSM and especially the SRB) and internationally, ESMA should be governed by a collec-
tive body of limited size (say, between five and seven members) with high standards of inde-
pendence and accountability, under more direct scrutiny of the European Parliament than 
is currently the case. The individuals involved should be vetted by the European Parliament 
under processes similar to those already in place for the six full-time members of the SRB and 
for the chair and vice-chair of the SSM’s Supervisory Board. The financing of ESMA should 
be fully covered by levies on supervised activities, again under the appropriate scrutiny of 
the European Parliament, as is the case for the SSM and SRB (and currently to an only partial 
extent for ESMA with levies on credit rating agencies and trade repositories). 
4  What further reforms might be envisaged 
in the longer term? 
The establishment in less than five years (2011-15) of six new EU financial authorities 
(EBA, EIOPA, ESMA, ESRB, SSM and the SRB), in addition to the pre-existing duties of the 
European Commission (including in its state aid control capacity) and of dozens of na-
tional authorities across the EU’s member states, has created significant new institutional 
complexity. This complexity entails costs and inefficiencies, and may in some situations 
impair the effectiveness of supervision. 
As argued above, it is not realistic or advisable to seek a radical streamlining of this 
EU-level architecture in the short term. While the ‘twin peaks’ approach advocated in this 
statement supports a vision of integrated prudential supervision of banks and insurers 
in the entire European Union, this is prevented in the near term by the treaty exclusion 
of an ECB role for insurance supervision, and also by the fact that several member states 
(including Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain) currently 
have separate insurance supervisors. Another key driver of the current multiplicity of 
authorities is that the euro area is only a subset of the European Union. This obstacle may 
erode over time, if any of the eight non-euro member states of the EU27 choose to join 
either the banking union through close cooperation or monetary union itself. Another 
driver of complexity is the fact that the responsibility for macro-prudential policy is awk-
wardly shared between national authorities, the ECB in the euro area, and the ESRB in the 
European Union. A further concern, particularly often mentioned in the German debate 
about financial sector policy, is that the embeddedness of banking supervision inside 
the ECB could result in conflicts between supervisory objectives and those of monetary 
policy. 
All these challenges deserve attention but, fortunately, none is critical at this juncture. 
In particular, the conflict between supervisory and monetary policy in the ECB appears 
more theoretical than real. Schoenmaker and Véron (2016) document the occasionally 
sub-optimal functioning of the SSM’s Supervisory Board, but the observed problems 
did not stem from interference with the ECB’s Governing Council. In fact, and contrary 
to many expectations, the fact that SSM decisions are subject to final approval by the Gov-
erning Council does not appear to have generated any bottleneck or significant delay in 
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the operation of banking union so far. (There have been, by contrast, many cases of delays 
and bottlenecks at the level of the Supervisory Board, including some that the SSM has 
acknowledged publicly). As for the SSM’s supervisory independence, it may have been 
less than perfect on some occasions19. But indications so far suggest that such lapses of 
independence were caused by political pressures originating in individual member states 
and possibly channelled through discussions and votes in the Supervisory Board, as 
opposed to an inherent misalignment of objectives with monetary policy and/or inter-
ference by the Governing Council or Executive Board. Overall, and based on detailed 
observation of nine member states together representing more than 95 percent of the 
euro area’s total banking assets, Schoenmaker and Véron (2016) find the SSM compar-
atively more immune from political interference than the national supervisors in the 
pre-SSM era. That said, the recommendations by the European Court of Auditors (2016) 
to “examine the risk posed by the system of shared services to the separation of functions 
[between the ECB and SSM], establish separate reporting lines for cases where specific 
supervisory resources are concerned and look into giving the Chair and the Vice-Chair of 
the Supervisory board stronger involvement in the [SSM] budgetary process” are appropri-
ate and should be implemented20. 
This analysis further supports the view that efforts should for the time being be con-
centrated on the reforms of EBA and ESMA as highlighted in this Policy Contribution. A 
case might also be made for further integration of insurance supervision within EIOPA (see 
Schoenmaker, 2016), but this should not be viewed as a matter of similar urgency. Beyond 
these, further intermediate steps, including the completion of Brexit, expansion of the 
banking union area (through close cooperation) and/or the euro area, and clarification of 
the desirable instruments of macroprudential policy in the European Union, should precede 
any radical realignment or streamlining of the present architecture of European financial 
authorities.
Disclaimer: The written statement submitted to the Bundestag on which this Policy 
Contribution is based also mentions that the author is an independent board member 
of the derivatives trade repository arm of DTCC (Depository Trust & Clearing Corpo-
ration), a US-headquartered financial services group that operates on a not-for-profit 
basis. As such, he is an independent director of three entities, of which two are incorpo-
rated in the United States and the third, DTCC Derivatives Repository Limited (DDRL), 
is incorporated in the United Kingdom. As a trade repository under EU law, DDRL is 
supervised by ESMA. Separately, the author is an investor in three venture capital funds 
managed by Newfund, a Paris-based investment management company registered with 
the French securities regulator AMF. The author does not view these affiliations and 
investments as creating any conflict of interest in the context of the Public Hearing. More 
information is available on www.bruegel.org.
19  The most questionable case so far in this respect is arguably the treatment of Deutsche Bank in the SSM’s stress 
testing exercise in 2016: see Laura Noonan, Caroline Binham and James Shotter, ‘Deutsche Bank received special 
treatment in EU stress tests: German lender’s result was boosted by a special concession agreed by the European 
Central Bank’, Financial Times, 10 October 2016. See also Case Study 1 on Monte dei Paschi di Siena in Transparen-
cy International EU (2017). 
20  The author of this paper is on record as being sceptical about the wisdom of entrusting the ECB with banking 
supervision at the time when banking union was initiated in mid-2012, given the potential for conflicts of interest 
between the monetary and supervisory mandates: see Véron (2012). Developments since then, however, have 
vindicated the choice to embed the SSM within the ECB. 
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